Review of Lawlessness and Government Responses to Minnesota’s 2020 Riots

October 2020

Joint Transportation and Judiciary and Public Safety Committee

Minnesota Senate
Minnesota Senate Joint Transportation and Judiciary and Public Safety Committee

In July 2020, the Minnesota Senate’s Standing Committees of Transportation Finance and Policy and Judiciary and Public Safety Finance and Policy held joint hearings to review the 2020 riots, the resulting lawlessness, and local and state governments’ responses. The joint committee hearings were held:

July 1 regarding the destruction of small businesses due to the rioting. Testifiers all worked in the Twin Cities and had their employment impacted by riots:
- Dr. Michael Shoff, Quenton Scherer, Jim Stage, Lonnie McQuirter, Matthew Kernan, and Bobby Awajane.

July 8 regarding the State Capitol complex’s security. Testifiers:
- Colonel Matt Langer of the Minnesota State Patrol and Commissioner John Harrington of the Minnesota Department of Public Safety.

July 9 regarding the state’s role in responding to the riots. Testifiers:
- Major General Jon Jensen, Adjutant General of the Minnesota National Guard and Commissioner John Harrington of the Minnesota Department of Public Safety.

July 15 regarding highway closures and local law enforcement’s response to the riots. Testifiers:
- Colonel Matt Langer of the Minnesota State Patrol; Commissioner Margret Anderson Kelliher of the Minnesota Department of Transportation; and Sergeant Sherral Schmidt, Sergeant Anna Hedberg, and Officer Rich Walker, all of the Minneapolis Police Department.

This report is based on information from the hearings, written testimony given to the joint committee, information obtained from data practice requests, and information presented by mainstream and social media.

Members of the Minnesota Senate Joint Committee on Transportation and Judiciary and Public Safety

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October 8, 2020

Members of the Public:

Earlier this year, people around the world watched as riots, sparked by the tragic and heartbreaking death of George Floyd, engulfed Minnesota. The Twin Cities burned, lives were lost, livelihoods destroyed, and fear pervaded neighborhoods. Consequently, the Minnesota Senate Transportation and Judiciary and Public Safety Committee held joint hearings to evaluate the nature and extent of the riots, review state and local government responses, and provide policymakers with recommendations for future action.

We thank the police officers, state agency personnel, and Minnesotans impacted by these events who cooperated with our evaluation. The testimony of these individuals, both in-person and in writing, was crucial to the conclusions and recommendations contained in this report.

We also thank the citizens and members of the press who utilized social media to document and report on the aftermath of the riots that occurred from May 26 to June 10, 2020. Much of the information we received came from media inquiries including vital information regarding the decisions made by Minnesota’s elected officials.

The riots (which are the subject of this inquiry) were and continue to be a public safety concern. Minnesotans have a right to government protection from these criminal acts. With this report, the facts involving the riots are contained in one location, together with conclusions and recommendations intended to assist all who live and work in our great state.

Sincerely,

Scott Newman  
Transportation Committee Chair

Warren Limmer  
Judiciary and Public Safety Committee
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Report Summary

After George Floyd’s death, Minnesota experienced an unprecedented series of riots (primarily in the Twin Cities area) that included arson, vandalism, looting, homicides, and assaults. As these riots grew, local law enforcement and law enforcement from around the state were so completely overwhelmed it was necessary to activate the entire contingent of the Minnesota National Guard in order to restore law and order. Activation of the full Minnesota National Guard had not occurred since World War II.

Lives were lost, over 1,500 businesses and buildings were burned, approximately $500 million in property damage occurred, and community morale was deeply affected.

As a result of these events, the Minnesota Senate convened several joint committee hearings consisting of members from the Transportation Finance and Policy Committee and the Judiciary and Public Safety Finance and Policy and Finance Committee (the Joint Committee). The Joint Committee’s purpose was to compile the facts, reach conclusions regarding the efficiency of state and local governments’ responses, and make recommendations to prevent similar catastrophes in the future.

As the hearings progressed and the facts were examined, a theme emerged highlighting the response of both the state and local governments and their respective elected officials. The main themes that led the Joint Committee to the conclusions and recommendations found in this report were:

1. **Failure to Lead**: Executive leadership at the state and local level failed to distinguish between demonstrators and rioters. Furthermore, leaders failed to provide the guidance Minnesotans expect from their offices.

2. **Philosophical Conflict Caused a Hesitation to Confront Ideological Allies**: Minnesota Governor Tim Walz and elected local leaders identified with the causes promoted by the demonstrators, causing them to lose sight of their responsibility to protect the public from criminal acts committed during the riots.

3. **Underestimation of the Escalation and Organization of the Riots**: Governor Walz did not realize the severity of events as they unfolded, resulting in a delayed reaction and increased violence.

4. **Refusal to Confront Criminal Violence with Force**: Governor Walz and Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey initially chose to negotiate with and appease the rioters rather than give law enforcement the authority to confront criminal acts with enough force to restore law and order. A primary responsibility of the Office of the Governor of the State of Minnesota and local elected officials is to protect the public. Inaction on the part of state and local officials led to an increase in violence.
This summary is based on evidence presented to the Joint Committee and throughout this report. The Joint Committee’s conclusions and recommendations contained in this report are supported by over 350 fact citations from hearings, press conferences, news articles, data practice requests, and written testimony.

**Key Facts, Findings and Conclusions:**

As stated in Article 1, Section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution, “Government is instituted for the security, benefit and protection of the people...”10 A core function of government is to protect citizens from being murdered, injured, fearful of their lives, or having their livelihoods destroyed. During the 2020 riots, elected leaders failed to protect Minnesotans. As Governor Walz stated, there was an “abject failure” in the government’s response during these riots.11 Governor Walz and city officials failed to acknowledge the seriousness of the situation and failed to confront the lawlessness with sufficient force in a timely manner.

**Key Facts:**

1. Significant rioting and destruction occurred in Minnesota between May 26 and June 10, 2020. Since then, communities experienced additional rioting and lawlessness. These riots caused the deaths of at least three Minnesotans as well as injury to both citizens and law enforcement. Looting, vandalism, loss of business, and the destruction of public and personal property went unchecked for approximately five days.

2. It was primarily Minnesotans from the metropolitan area who were arrested for inciting the violence.

3. Governor Walz first mobilized the Minnesota National Guard on the afternoon of Thursday, May 28, 18 hours after Mayor Frey requested assistance. The Minnesota National Guard was not fully mobilized until four days after the first building was burned.

4. Minneapolis law enforcement stated that if the mayor of Minneapolis had allowed them to use nonlethal force to stop rioters then they could have held the Third Precinct.

5. Following the full mobilization of the Minnesota National Guard on Saturday, May 30, 2020 order was restored.
6. Morale within the law enforcement community and the community at large (particularly in Minneapolis) has suffered greatly due to the actions and inaction of Governor Walz, Mayor Frey, and the Minneapolis City Council. One hundred Minneapolis police officers have left or resigned with over 75 more estimated to leave the department.  

7. Arrests of those responsible were not made in a timely or consistent manner. With the failure to prosecute and hold rioters accountable, criminal activity continues to increase over the five-year average.

Key Conclusions:
1. Governor Walz, his administration and Mayor Frey failed to realize the seriousness of the riots and the danger to Minnesotans if rioters were not confronted and stopped.

2. Both Governor Walz and Mayor Frey failed to act in a timely manner to confront rioters with necessary force due to an ill-conceived philosophical belief that such an action would exacerbate the rioting.

3. If Mayor Frey had acted in a decisive manner and allowed law enforcement to use non-lethal force to stop the rioters, the destruction of the Third Precinct would not have occurred, and the rioting would not have escalated as quickly as it did.

4. If Governor Walz had acted in a decisive manner by activating the Minnesota National Guard when requested, the riots would have been brought under control much faster.

5. The Minneapolis City Council’s history of inadequately funding their police department while also proposing to eliminate and/or defund them poses a danger to citizens throughout Minnesota.

6. With criminal activity increasing (particularly in Minneapolis), the safety of not only the residents of Minneapolis, but the entire State of Minnesota is jeopardized.

Protests, peaceful demonstrations, and civil disobedience are all part of our nation’s history. Elected leaders must be able to distinguish the difference between legal First Amendment expressions of free speech and criminal activity that puts the public in danger. While the first is a guaranteed constitutional right, the second carries with it the responsibility of government to protect the people from danger and use such force as necessary to fulfill that obligation.
Key Recommendations:

1. With public safety being a core function of government, law enforcement at all levels of government must be provided with the necessary equipment, personnel, and authority to confront and stop riots before they escalate.

2. Those who commit criminal acts under the guise of social protest must be arrested and prosecuted.

3. The Governor of Minnesota must recognize their affirmative duty to act as necessary to protect the public during riots and the danger of not addressing criminal activity.

4. Elected leaders in both the executive and legislative branches must recognize that public safety is a critical necessity. Bipartisan support and cooperation to protect the safety and security of Minnesotans in the face of rioting is a duty that must be fulfilled.

5. Minnesota Governors must activate the Minnesota National Guard when necessary and without hesitation to assist law enforcement in controlling riots and protecting the public.

This summary reflects a condensed version of the entire report and is intended to assist the reader in understanding the gravity of the public safety issues contained within. A thorough understanding of the facts documented in the body of this report is the basis for the conclusions and recommendations.
Main Themes of the Report

As the hearings progressed and the facts were examined, a theme emerged highlighting the response of both the state and local governments and their respective elected officials. The main themes that led the Joint Committee to the conclusions and recommendations found in this report were:

1. **Failure to Lead**: Executive leadership at the state and local level failed to distinguish between demonstrators and rioters. Furthermore, leaders failed to provide the guidance Minnesotans expect from their offices.

2. **Philosophical Conflict Caused a Hesitation to Confront Ideological Allies**: Governor Walz and elected local leaders identified with the causes promoted by the demonstrators, causing them to lose sight of their responsibility to protect the public from criminal acts committed during the riots.

3. **Underestimation of the Escalation and Organization of the Riots**: Governor Walz did not realize the severity of events as they unfolded, resulting in a delayed reaction and increased violence.

4. **Refusal to Confront Criminal Violence with Force**: Governor Walz and Mayor Frey initially chose to negotiate with and appease the rioters rather than give law enforcement the authority to confront criminal acts with enough force to restore law and order. A primary responsibility of the Office of the Governor and local elected officials is to protect the public. Inaction on the part of state and local officials led to an increase in violence.
Destruction of Minnesota

The facts presented below outline and describe what occurred during the 2020 Minnesota riots. Minnesota suffered much destruction as illustrated in the following facts.

Degree of Destruction and Rioting:

- Destruction and rioting were so intense that the only event Adjutant General Jon Jensen of the Minnesota National Guard could compare it to was his time in Iraq.31
- Governor Walz compared the situation to “war-torn parts of Iraq and Somalia.”32
- The Minnesota National Guard was fully mobilized for the first time since World War II.33
- When describing two of the worst days of rioting in Minnesota, Governor Walz stated that it was, “48 hours of anarchy.”34
- The riots and resulting damage caused to Minnesota was the second-most destructive period of local unrest in United States history, following the 1992 Los Angeles riots.35

Deaths Occurred Due to the Riots:

- Calvin Horton Jr. was shot in the torso near Cadillac Pawn while protests turned violent and looters broke into businesses.36
- An unidentified man was murdered during the riots, and his body burned in a maX iT PAWN store.37
- The Minneapolis Police Department Assistant Chief and a Deputy Chief were flagged down by a motorist who found a deceased woman in a car at 17th and Bryant Avenue North. This woman was the victim of a homicide.38

Financial, Physical, and Emotional Harm to Our Citizens:

- Throughout Minnesota, over $500 million in property damage occurred during the riots.39
- Throughout Minnesota, over 1,500 properties were damaged during the riots.40
  - In comparison, this is almost three times as many businesses as there are in the entire Mall of America.41
  - By contrast, 842 out of the 853 cities in Minnesota have fewer businesses in their entire cities than the amount of properties damaged during the Minnesota riots.42,43
- Below is a map showing some of the destruction in the Minneapolis area. Additional maps and a long list of businesses damaged by the rioting can be seen in full here: https://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-st-paul-buildings-are-damaged-looted-after-george-floyd-protests-riots/569930671/

   ![Map of Minneapolis showing destruction](https://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-st-paul-buildings-are-damaged-looted-after-george-floyd-protests-riots/569930671/)

- City officials expect it to take at least 10 years to rebuild the critical business corridors destroyed in the rioting.44
- Because of these riots, residents lost their community, their history, their livelihoods, and suffered emotional trauma.45 Residents could not go to grocery stores to get food nor go to pharmacies to get medicine they needed to survive.46,47,48
  - Medical records were lost due to the riots and fires.49
• Organizations and businesses serving communities of color were some of the most devastated by the rioting and arson.50
  o Destruction on Lake Street in South Minneapolis through West Broadway in North Minneapolis hit immigrant and minority-owned businesses who were already struggling amid the pandemic-induced shutdown.51
  o Because of the riots, ethnically diverse neighborhoods are grappling with the losses of jobs, services, and investments.52
  o One citizen stated, “It’s very hard to see your whole life savings go down like this. We used up all our money to build something nice for ... not just the Latino community but everybody. Small, minority business owners found themselves with the businesses that they worked their fingers to the bone building destroyed, looted, vandalized, and burned down.”53
  o Governor Walz’s own talking points stated, “We recognize that the neighborhoods in Minneapolis were [sic] the events (riots) took place last night are home to many Black, Indigenous, Latinx, African immigrant, and other immigrant and refugee neighbors.”54
• Commander Scott Gerlicher of the Minneapolis Police Department described the destruction and the inability of local police to control the rioting: “The situation was dire, and we needed assistance immediately.”55
• Many rioters were exclusively looking to cause chaos:
  o Rioters cut holes in the wood protection over doors to throw incendiary devices into businesses.56
  o As stated by one business owner, “They were just there for destruction.”57
  o As one individual who emailed the Minneapolis Police Department stated, “How do you feel with your 3rd Precinct burned and destroyed? I feel good and excellent/ Ha ha ha !!! That was good !!![sic]”58
• Those that wanted to lawfully have their voices heard were not able to do so due to the rioting.59
  o Governor Walz’s talking points stated his administration was unable to protect everyone’s freedom of speech, “if the safety of demonstrators and others in our community are in danger.”60
• Between May 25 and July 15 there were nearly 20 homicides and approximately 140 people shot in Minneapolis.61
  o As of September 1, there have been 56 murders in Minneapolis in 2020.62
    ▪ There are eight more homicides than all that occurred in Minneapolis in 2019.63
  o As of September 15, 400 people have been shot in Minneapolis in 2020.64
  o As of September 3, St. Paul has had 23 homicides in 2020.65
    ▪ This is a 50% increase over 2019 murders during the same reporting period.66
The Turning Point: The Third Precinct Falls

- The last time a police precinct was surrendered was in 1863.\textsuperscript{67}
- The Third Precinct falling was the “straw that broke the department’s back.”\textsuperscript{68}
- Once people heard that the Third Precinct was being given up, they knew it was a big turning point. They became more fearful as they knew that if the Third Precinct went down there was no way the city and state could keep them safe.\textsuperscript{69}
  - Minneapolis residents felt abandoned after officers left the Third Precinct.\textsuperscript{70}
- The Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Public Safety (Public Safety) stated it was when the Third Precinct fell on Thursday, May 28 that the state understood locals were too overwhelmed to handle it themselves.\textsuperscript{71}
  - At this point the Commissioner of Public Safety received a request for Minnesota National Guard assistance on the night of Wednesday, May 27 stating the locals were overwhelmed and needed help.\textsuperscript{72}
- Police precincts are a symbol to the community of safety, and it was shocking for police officers to see that symbol, their “home,” be destroyed.\textsuperscript{73}
- The thought among police and citizens was that if one is willing to abandon a police precinct then one would be willing to give up anything.\textsuperscript{74}

Firefighters Were Not Able to Fight Fires:

- At one point during the riots, Minneapolis firefighters quit responding to arsons and only responded to medical emergencies because they did not feel safe due to being attacked and having their gear stolen.\textsuperscript{75}
- Without direction from Governor Walz or the City of Minneapolis, General Jensen had to tell Governor Walz that the Minnesota National Guard was going to protect the firefighters until the city had the situation under control again.\textsuperscript{76}
- The owner of 7-Sigma in Minneapolis, Kris Wyrobek stated, “They didn’t protect our people. We were all on our own.” A fire started in an apartment complex being built nearby which alarmed workers who lived in the neighborhood. Wyrobek said, “The fire engine was just sitting there, but they wouldn’t do anything.”\textsuperscript{77}
- The destruction was so severe that members of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms National Response Team were sent to Minneapolis and St. Paul to investigate the fires set to local businesses during the rioting.\textsuperscript{78}
- Through six days of riots, the St. Paul Fire Department responded to over 1,150 calls for service.\textsuperscript{79}
  - Four St. Paul firefighters were injured due to the rioting.\textsuperscript{80}
Commander Gerlicher described the inability of the firefighters to be able to stop the fires:
  o “At the time of these fires, there were hundreds and sometimes thousands of protestors in the area. This made a traditional response to the fires impossible as fire crews could not safely get to them to put them out. MPD resources were completely overwhelmed and we did not have sufficient numbers of officers and squad cars to accompany fire crews into these hostile scenes as officers would have to take and hold an area for several hours in order to have MFD respond and extinguish the fires.”

Rioters Intentionally Injured Police:
  - Here are some of objects and ways rioters tried to harm police officers:
    o Multiple Gunshots
    o Molotov Cocktails
    o Commercial Grade Fireworks
    o Bricks
    o Rocks
    o Bottles
    o Gallons of Milk
    o Paintballs Guns
    o Homemade Projectiles
    o Bottles Filled with Cement, Nails or Rocks
    o Skinned Pig Heads
    o Mortar Rounds
    o Vehicles
  - This was an extremely dangerous situation for police officers.
    o Several officers were severely injured and went to the hospital.
    o Approximately two dozen Minneapolis Police Officers suffered some type of acute physical injury.
  - Officers at the Third Precinct were so afraid for their lives that they had messages passed along to their families as they thought they would never see loved ones again.
    o Some of those officers even saved bullets for themselves in case they were overrun.
    o Minneapolis police officers believed their department left them to die in the Third Precinct.
• Commander Gerlicher stated the plan was to hold the Third Precinct by putting in a tactical SWAT team and use non-lethal forces to protect the building.90
  o Many officers were not given the official order to abandon the building, and their personal belongings burned with the rest of the building.91
  o Some officers were informed by the Longfellow Business Association that “The police would be abandoning the precinct and would be leaving us to defend for ourselves in the middle of a riot.”92
  o When the Third Precinct was taken, sensitive information was left behind in officers’ desks.93
• Some police officers stated they were never as broken as they were when “their leaders gave up on their home,” while others stated they are “publicly humiliated to serve on a department full of leaders who thought our building was nothing but bricks and mortar.”94

Timeline of the Destruction:
Below are some events highlighted from Commander Gerlicher’s timeline:95

Tuesday, May 26th:
• 1824 hours – Squad surrounded/trapped at 34th/Chicago Ave
• 1829 hours – Squad surrounded/trapped at 35th/Hiawatha Ave. Mace authorized to rescue Officers
• 1833 hours – Squad with two Officers still trapped
  o a. Protestors throwing objects at squad
  o b. Officers sent in on foot to rescue Squad w/ Officers
  o c. 1837 hours all Officers out

Wednesday, May 27th:
• 0342 hours – Protestor/Rioter shoots high powered bb gun at Officers in front of the 3rd Precinct
• 0400 hours – Front door of 3rd Precinct shot out
• 2111 hours - Chief Arradondo sends written request for MN National Guard assistance to DPS Commissioner Harrington.
• 2149 hours – Crowd attempting to barricade the fire department in at 27th and Lake
• 2336 hours – Crowd attempted to pull officer into the crowd at the precinct

Thursday, May 28th:
• 1716 hours – Stabbing at Target, Strike Team 1 responding
• 1944 hours – Fire rig trying to reach patient is getting eggs thrown at them
• 1944 hours – Gate compromised at the 3rd Precinct and barricade is breached
• 2101 hours – Officers taking paintball rounds, frozen water bottles, rocks, and mortar rounds in rear of 3rd Precinct
• 2155 hours – Order given to Evacuate the 3rd precinct
• 2215 hours – PRECINCT 3 IS COMPROMISED
Friday, May 29th:
- 0316 hours- MPD Assistant Chief and Deputy Chief are flagged down by a motorist who found a deceased woman in a car at 17th/Bryant Ave N. This woman was the victim of a homicide.
- 1852 hours – National Guard Military convoy got stuck in crowd and needs evacuation; 3rd Precinct
- 1950 hours – State Patrol completely surrounded; 3rd Precinct
- 2018 hours – Shots fired on Hiawatha Ave at Officers; 3rd Precinct
- 2057 hours – National Guard and State Patrol not available; 5th Precinct
- 2110 hours – Crowd back on 35W after marching throughout Downtown, State Patrol not available to assist; 1st Precinct
- 2334 hours – Molotov being thrown at front of precinct, gas delivered; 5th Precinct
- 2338 hours – Multiple injured officers; 5th Precinct
- 2341 hours – Shots fired at officers; 5th Precinct

Saturday, May 30th:
- 2253 hours – Squad 1281 airs “shots fired at police” at 14th/Lake St.; 3rd Precinct
- 2254 hours – Shots fired at officers, two in custody; gun recovered.

Key Findings:
- The 2020 Minnesota riots were an unprecedented and catastrophic situation. People died; businesses were destroyed; and livelihoods were lost. Food and medicine became nearly impossible to obtain; employment disappeared; and fear reigned over the state.
- Over 1,500 properties were damaged at a value of over $500 million. This is three times as many businesses than are in the Mall of America.
- This is Minnesota, not war-torn Iraq or Syria. The state should never be in a situation where that comparison is made again. Firefighters should never be blocked or injured trying to fight fires. Police should not have skinned pig heads and Molotov cocktails thrown at them for trying to keep the peace.
- The murderers, arsonists, and looters were not demonstrating. They were not exercising their First Amendment rights; they are criminals trying to cause destruction, anarchy, and take advantage of the chaos.
- Public safety is a core function of government, and government failed to protect its citizens during the 2020 riots in Minnesota.
Residency of the Rioters

The outline below describes where the various rioters from the 2020 Minnesota riots came from as identified via arrest records.

Hennepin County Arrests from May 25 – June 2, 2020:96

Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office:
- May 26: 4 (2 Minneapolis, 1 Brooklyn Park, 1 Plymouth)
- May 27: 1 (1 Minneapolis)
- May 28: 0
- May 29: 9 (4 Minneapolis, 1 St. Paul, 1 Brooklyn Center, 1 Robbinsdale, 1 Eagan, 1 Alaska)
- May 30: 38 (21 Minneapolis, 3 St. Paul, 2 Hastings, 2 Lakeville, 1 each: Big Lake, Brooklyn Park, Burnsville, Crystal, Osseo, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, Wisconsin, no permanent address)
- May 31: 48 (13 Minneapolis, 4 St. Paul, 3 Wisconsin, 2 Andover, 2 Mound, 2 Ramsey, 2 Roseville, 2 North Dakota, 2 Iowa, 1 each: Blaine, Brooklyn Center, Brooklyn Park, Cass Lake, Coon Rapids, Lakeville, Montrose, Northfield, Oakdale, Richfield, Rochester, Wabasha, Unknown, Nebraska, Oregon, no permanent address)
- June 1: 16 (8 Minneapolis, 3 New York, 2 Plymouth, 1 each: Duluth, St. Paul, Illinois)
- June 2: 2 (2 Minneapolis)

Total arrests: 118
- 91 from Metro Minnesota (of which 51 were from Minneapolis).97
- 18 from outside of the state.
- 6 from Greater Minnesota.
- 3 are unknown or have no permanent addresses (NPA).

Over 77% of those arrested were from the Metro area of Minnesota of which over 56% were from the City of Minneapolis; a little over 15% were from out of state; and a total of 5% came from Greater Minnesota.98
St. Paul Arrests as of May 31:99

- Five from St. Paul
- Three from Woodbury
- Two from Minneapolis
- One from St. Louis Park
- One from Mankato
- One from Fort Worth, Texas
- One from La Crosse, Wisconsin
- One from Grand Forks, North Dakota
- One from Fargo, North Dakota
- Two Unknown

Total arrests: 18100
- 11 from Metro Minnesota (of which 5 were from St. Paul).
- 4 from outside of the state.
- 1 from Greater Minnesota.
- 2 are unknown.

Governor Walz and Mayor Carter’s Comments on the Residency of Rioters:
- Governor Walz stated drug cartels were participating in and taking advantage of the unrest.101
- St. Paul Mayor Melvin Carter stated all rioters who were arrested in his city were from out of state.102 Mayor Carter later corrected that incorrect statement.103
- Governor Walz stated the people in the streets “are not our neighbors. They are not the people who did the work to build Lake Street, to build community.” He stated that assertion was based on intelligence gleaned by state officials.104
- Governor Walz stated he may have been overly optimistic in his hope that it was not Minnesotans doing the worst damage.105
- According to the Commissioner of Public Safety, about 25% of the people arrested were not from Minnesota which contradicted what Governor Walz and other leaders said a day earlier when they suggested that 80% of violent demonstrators came from outside the state.106
Key Findings:

- Murder, looting, arson, and destruction of property is violent criminal behavior. These rioters deserve to face the legal consequences of their actions through the criminal justice system.

- Despite claims to the contrary, the overwhelming majority of those who were arrested for causing this destruction were Minnesotans.
  - Though some individuals from outside of the state and from Greater Minnesota did travel to the Twin Cities to participate in the rioting, it was mainly people living in the metropolitan area who engaged in the destruction.

- Contrary to what Governor Walz stated, there is not any evidence that drug cartels were participating in the riots and looting.

- Unfortunately, there are people in the state willing and capable of committing the intense kind of violence and lawbreaking witnessed this spring. Many of the rioters were not detained, arrested, or faced adjudication in a court of law. That result left many rioters free to continue roaming the streets in search of their next opportunity to commit further havoc and destruction.
Failure to Respond

The facts presented below outline and describe the government’s response to the 2020 Minnesota riots.

Elected Leaders Fail to Respond:

- As stated by KARE 11 reporter Lou Raguse on the night of Wednesday, May 27, “Where is the Governor?????????”
- WCCO reporter Pat Kessler stated, “We have not heard from our city leadership nor Governor Walz about taming down this violence.”
- KARE 11 reporter Julie Nelson stated, “I feel the city, the state needs to hear from our leaders, we need to hear from you, we are in complete chaos in Minneapolis and St. Paul. Please call in, please respond to the questions that your citizens are asking of you. Why were these decisions made? What is the plan? People are getting incredibly scared...we are getting into a situation where people are not safe. We want you at home to know, we have tried, we are trying to get people on the phone, the decision makers to explain the thought behind this and to explain what the plan is.”
- As stated by KSTP reporter Tom Hauser, “None of the key leaders at the state or City of Minneapolis level have even communicated on Twitter tonight.”
- When discussing Mayor Frey’s press conference at 2:00 a.m. on Wednesday, May 27, FOX 9 reporter Tom Lyden stated, “That was simply one of the strangest, most rattled, evasive, and unclear news conferences I’ve seen. What’s the plan? Who is in charge? What are your resources?”
- Governor Walz’s office chose to send an email update only to Democratic-Farmer-Labor (DFL) caucus members of the Minnesota House of Representatives and Minnesota Senate.
- Governor Walz’s office kept certain DFL congressional representatives “informed about the state’s response” but failed to keep any Republican congressional representatives informed.
- While the riots occurred, Governor Walz’s office was solely working with the DFL Minnesota House of Representatives rather than both legislative bodies and both political parties on criminal justice legislation.
- The Minneapolis Police Department put out a public relations campaign in the middle of the rioting to get people to try and convince “elected officials to call for peace in this tragic time within our city.”
• Below is one example a citizen shared with the city of Minneapolis regarding the lack of response:

Why did the City let them burn us to the ground!???? Where is the Police??? Where are the firefighters??? Where is the National Guard!??

Today is Day 3 - Not much else left on E Lake St. to set on fire other than homes! The Latino Community is reeling from Floyd’s death, COVID19 and now this devastation and upcoming financial ruin.

What is next? Who will protect us? What is the plan?

• Governor Walz’s staff stated that “the Gov wants DPS and NG to tweet about the deployment of the state patrol and guard members tonight” because “He’s seeing criticism of not stopping protesters.”

• Governor Walz stated that he failed the media and the public regarding the riots that occurred the night before.

The Police Lacked the Resources and Manpower Needed to Protect Our Citizens:

• In December 2019, Chief Arradondo requested funding for an additional 400 patrol officers by 2025. After viewing this request, the Minneapolis City Council decided to keep the police department’s force the same size.

• When businesses owners asked how to get police protection, the response was they did not know, and that citizens should try to get ahold of the mayor’s office or police chief.

  o There was never an answer from either of those offices.

• The only way some businesses were able to keep from getting looted and burned was when owners and employees risked their own safety by standing guard every night.

  o As the city and state were not there to help, many businesses needed to hire private security or have friends and neighbors stand guard.

• When people called 911, they were told that if the situation were not “life threatening” then the police would not get there for four days.

  o One individual stated there were fires started near gas tanks next to houses but that this was not enough to get the police to show up.

• At one-point, other cities showed up to offer mutual aid to Minneapolis, but the City of Minneapolis never used their assistance.

• Some 911 calls were going completely unanswered throughout the rioting.

  o In one specific case, someone tried calling 911 because there were rioters trying to firebomb the gas station next to his house. The individual was afraid the fire would extend to his house and his wife (who is handicapped) would be trapped. There was only a busy signal when calling 911.
• The most serious types of 911 calls, which are usually responded to immediately, were unanswered for extended periods of time because of the rioting.\(^{130}\)  
  o The dangers of not responding to these calls were stated by Commander Gerlicher, “Obviously, not having the immediate response capabilities is of concern... Delays in response certainly does have the potential for further property damage, looting, thefts and could pose additional safety risks to the public.”\(^{131}\)  
• The Minneapolis Police Department was forced into a defensive position during the rioting with no ability to safely respond to and stop the looting and arson.\(^{132}\)  
  o Massive protests, looting, and riots took place citywide, spreading Minneapolis Police Department’s resources too thin.\(^{133}\)  
  o Throughout the early days of the rioting, police resources remained stretched beyond Minneapolis Police Department’s ability to respond to emergency calls for service.\(^{134}\)

**Key Findings:**  
• Even the media including WCCO, KARE 11, KSTP, and Fox 9 were openly asking where elected leaders were.  
• When citizens needed to know why cities were burning and what was being done to stop it, elected leaders were nowhere to be found.  
• Governor Walz was more concerned about his popularity and tweeting then he was about stopping the riots.  
• Governor Walz only worked with the DFL during and in the immediate aftermath of the riots.  
• Due to the Minneapolis City Council’s lack of funding for police and the failure of Mayor Frey and Governor Walz to provide the resources and personnel needed, police were forced to act in a defensive nature and thus were unable to respond effectively to the lawlessness occurring throughout the city. This forced citizens to protect themselves as the city and governor were not protecting them.  
• The failure of the largest city in Minnesota to fully fund its police force puts the entire state in danger.  
• Delays in response, particularly for the most serious 911 calls, allowed for more rioting, destruction, looting, and violence. Mayor Frey and Governor Walz never should have allowed that to happen.
Failure of Governor Walz and His Administration to Realize the Seriousness of the Riots

The facts presented below outline and describe the use of intelligence, tactics, and response of Governor Walz and his administration during the 2020 Minnesota riots.

**Failure of Intelligence:**
- With respect to events on the Capitol Complex, Governor Walz’s administration knew rioters were coming to the State Capitol building five hours and 33 minutes before Capitol property was destroyed. Minnesota state troopers arrived one hour and 19 minutes before the destruction of Capitol property, but only one state trooper was present when the destruction occurred.\(^\text{135}\)
- With respect to the rioting in the Twin Cities, Governor Walz was asked about allowing protesters to violate state laws regarding congregation. He replied, “You’re seeing holes in planning, that’s for darn sure.”\(^\text{136}\)
- Governor Walz admitted he, “underestimated the wanton destruction and sheer size of this crowd.”\(^\text{137}\)
- Governor Walz never reached out to Minneapolis Police Department to better understand the situation on the ground.\(^\text{138}\)
- The Commissioner of Public Safety admitted they failed to properly view and understand the intelligence that was before them.\(^\text{139}\)
- On Tuesday, May 26 Governor Walz’s administration did not expect rioting.\(^\text{140}\)
  - On Wednesday, May 27, Governor Walz’s administration did not expect the rioting to continue.\(^\text{141}\)
  - On Thursday, May 28, Governor Walz’s administration once again did not expect rioting to continue.\(^\text{142}\)
  - On Friday May 29, Governor Walz stated they did not think the rioting would continue.\(^\text{143}\)
  - The Commissioner of Public Safety admitted it was a fair criticism to say the state failed to see the criminal activity that was rapidly escalating and failed to see it was beyond the local’s capacity to handle.\(^\text{144}\)

**Failed Tactics:**
- The Commissioner of Public Safety stated rioters had “speed and a tactical advantage over us in the early days of last week.”\(^\text{145}\)
  - The Commissioner of Public Safety admitted, “Friday night was an unpleasant surprise, I got outguessed tactically in terms of the numbers and the strategies.”\(^\text{146}\)
- When dealing with rioters on the night of Friday, May 29, Governor Walz’s administration prepared for a “frontal battle in one area.”\(^\text{147}\)
- The Commissioner of Public Safety agreed the plan to stop the destruction was not effective.\(^\text{148}\)
• The Commissioner of Public Safety agreed that rather than having multiple points of command as there was throughout the rioting, it would have been better to have had a single point of command.\textsuperscript{149}

• Governor Walz’s administration was not fully using the Minnesota State Patrol or the Minnesota National Guard’s aviation support which would have allowed them to know the rioters’ positions in comparison to their own.\textsuperscript{150}
  o In Governor Walz’s talking points from Thursday, May 28, it was mentioned that the Minnesota State Patrol’s helicopters and aircraft would be available.\textsuperscript{151}
  o Regarding the fourth night of rioting, the Commissioner of Public Safety stated that in retrospect they should have used more aviation support.\textsuperscript{152}
  o The Commissioner of Public Safety continued that without the aviation support they were “running blind” and “playing whack a mole.”\textsuperscript{153}

• Below is what Governor Walz’s daughter, Hope Walz, tweeted about the Minnesota National Guard’s movements:

Photo taken from: https://alphanews.mn/governor-walzs-daughter-threatens-state-senator/
• The City of Minneapolis consistently requested more Minnesota National Guard troops than Governor Walz deployed.154
  o The Commissioner of Public Safety forced the city to prioritize their requests 42 hours after they initially requested assistance because there were not enough Minnesota National Guard troops available to complete all the missions the city needed assistance with.155
  o The Commissioner of Public Safety admitted the state failed to be a good partner to the cities.156
• General Jensen understood the rioting was not going away until the situation was under control.157

**Governor Walz Failed to Act:**
• On the early morning of Friday, May 29 Governor Walz stated, “There will be a presence out on the corners”; however, that night was some of the worst destruction of the rioting.158
• On Saturday, May 30, Governor Walz stated, “The sheer number of rioters has made it impossible to make coherent arrests... There are simply more of them than us.”159
• When discussing the riots the month before, Mayor Frey stated that “Gov. Tim Walz failed to take his requests for help seriously until it was too late.”160
  o Governor Walz’s administration was expecting the City of Minneapolis to coordinate all of Minneapolis’s assets, assets from other cities through mutual aid, and state assets including the Minnesota State Patrol, Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) officers, emergency center personnel, and the Minnesota National Guard.161
• The Commissioner of Public Safety blamed Minneapolis stating it is normally the city’s job to respond to rioting.162
• On Friday, May 29, while watching the failed attempt of the Minneapolis Police Department to push back rioters and then retreat, Minnesota Lieutenant Governor Peggy Flanagan texted Governor Walz that she “Didn’t see State Patrol or NG” present.163
• Governor Walz’s administration admitted they wanted to “wait for assignments” from the City of Minneapolis before having the Minnesota National Guard engage.164

**Leaders of Law Enforcement Agree that Governor Walz and His Administration Could Have Ended the Riots Earlier:**
• General Jensen said, “If we had done things differently on Tuesday, as it relates to numbers, as it relates to tactics, could we have avoided some of this? My unprofessional opinion as it relates to law enforcement is ‘yes’. My professional military opinion is ‘yes’.”165
• The Commissioner of Public Safety stated they should have brought people in sooner.166
• The Commissioner of Public Safety stated if they had mobilized the right people and tactics earlier then the state could have been a lot more successful. His belief is if it would have been done properly then the state could have started getting control back Wednesday, May 27 rather than Saturday, May 30.167
• Commander Gerlicher stated, “The sooner that a significant activation of the National Guard was made, the more likely a more rapid deployment of Guard resources would occur.”168
• Commander Gerlicher stated he believed they were finally able to go from a defensive to offensive posture, significantly lessening the looting and violence on Saturday, May 30, “because all participating agencies were able to get more organized.”169
• Commander Gerlicher stated the earlier the city had received assistance and the more assistance they would have received from the state, the more likely they would have been able to control the riots, protect property, and lessen damage caused by fires.170
• When asked if there should have been a Minnesota National Guard presence on every corner as a deterrent, Governor Walz stated, “It’s a valid critique.”171
• General Jensen stated that the proper people with the right tactics were successful almost 100% of the time.172

Key Findings:
• Governor Walz assumed the rioting would not be as bad as it was or continue as long as it did, and the rioters would go home rather than riot during a curfew. Governor Walz failed to effectively use the information and intelligence at his disposal. His incorrect assumptions directly led to escalating violence over a five-day period.
• Governor Walz allowed his adult daughter to access confidential information that she then disseminated to the general public and rioters. This unnecessarily put police, Minnesota State Troopers, and the Minnesota National Guard in jeopardy.
• Governor Walz promised to bring out law enforcement to keep Minnesota safe but instead he chose to wait for others to act.
• Governor Walz and his administration decided to plan for “frontal battles,” refuse aviation support, hold the Minnesota National Guard in reserve, and blame rather than support the cities. Due to this inaction, rioters ended up having a “tactical advantage” over Governor Walz’s administration forcing the state to play “Whack a Mole” with rioters rather than stop them.
• As shown above, General Jensen, Commander Gerlicher, the Commissioner of Public Safety and Mayor Frey all agreed that Governor Walz and his administration could have and should have stopped these riots sooner.
• Governor Walz had the ability and duty to use force and law enforcement to stop criminal violence, but he did not. Governor Walz was not willing to do what was necessary to stop the rioting right away because he was having a philosophical debate about whether the use of force should be used to stop violence.
Elected Leaders Debate Whether or Not to Use Law Enforcement to Stop the Rioters

The facts presented below outline and describe Governor Walz, his administration, and Mayor Frey’s thought processes throughout the 2020 Minnesota riots.

Governor Walz’s Philosophical Debate:

- Governor Walz stated, “There is philosophically an argument to be made that an armed presence on the ground in the midst of where we just had a police killing is seen as a catalyst.”
  - He then stated that for this specific situation, his argument was the catalyst already occurred, and the city was already burning so more officers and troops should be present.
  - But he then stated he was trying to strike a balance between more law enforcement and appeasing the rioters.
  - The result was on the night of Friday, May 29 after his comments stating more officers and Minnesota National Guard were necessary, law enforcement was not out in full force that night to protect citizens.

- Governor Walz said “deciding when to move and with what level of force was a delicate balance.”
  - When deciding the level of law enforcement, Governor Walz said another dynamic to factor in is “a community that is raw from law enforcement. Keeping in mind that the spark that lit this was law enforcement killing an innocent man on the street.”

- When talking about the riots, use of force, and the communities affected, Governor Walz stated it is about “…understanding what the community needs but not coming in heavy-handed with them.”

- Governor Walz’s talking points stated the governor had to weigh difficult decisions between the poor options that were available.
  - In addition, Governor Walz’s talking points emphasized a distinction between “enforcement and protection.” “The distinction may seem like a play on words, but right now many are concerned about over-enforcement by the police... The states response is one of protections of public safety” not one of enforcement of state laws.

- When denouncing the violence and destruction caused by rioting, Governor Walz’s office told its staff that “Having monitored social [media] of other electeds today, we need to be very careful with messaging like this as not to be tone deaf or dismissive...or put property above people.”
• When Mayor Frey pleaded for Minnesota National Guard assistance from Governor Walz, “He did not say yes.” Mayor Frey said of Governor Walz, “He said he would consider it.”\textsuperscript{185}
  o In texts between city staff regarding the governor calling in the Minnesota National Guard, city staff stated, “Walz was hesitating.”\textsuperscript{186}
  o Mayor Frey stated Governor Walz was “hesitating to call to send in the National Guard.”\textsuperscript{187}
• Governor Walz stated citizens would not see a lack of leadership, officers, Minnesota National Guard, or force on the night of Friday, May 29.\textsuperscript{188}
  o On the night of Friday, May 29, law enforcement was not out in enough force to stop or reduce the rioting.
• When asked if the plan was to let rioters take over the Third Precinct, Governor Walz responded, “The commitment to hold the third [Precinct] was one I was not comfortable with.”\textsuperscript{189}
  o When asked what his response to the Third Precinct being evacuated was, his response was, “You can’t have civil order deteriorate and then you have to make a calculated decision about does force going in there escalate it? Does it stop it?”\textsuperscript{190}
• When asked by a reporter if the Minnesota National Guard should have been present physically during the rioting that occurred on Thursday, May 28, Governor Walz blamed the mayors and said it was their decisions to not have the Minnesota National Guard out.\textsuperscript{191}
  o He then stated he would have done what the mayors did and not had law enforcement out en masse.\textsuperscript{192}
    - Then he backtracked and said yes, in retrospect there should have been a police and National Guard presence in the cities.\textsuperscript{193}
    • Governor Walz then switched his opinion once again and said you cannot prove a negative and having officers and the National Guard out there could have potentially made things worse.\textsuperscript{194}

The Minneapolis Mayor and City Council’s Philosophical Debate:
• Mayor Frey refused to use non-lethal methods to protect the Third Precinct even though Minneapolis police informed him they could hold the precinct solely using non-lethal methods.\textsuperscript{195}
  o Commander Gerlicher confirmed the directive to abandon the Third Precinct came from Mayor Frey through the Chief of Police.\textsuperscript{196}
    • Governor Walz clarified it was Mayor Frey who made the decision not to engage.\textsuperscript{197}
  o Minneapolis police officers never had a situation where the mayor, governor and the Commissioner of Public Safety were making these types of decisions rather than local police.\textsuperscript{198}
• Minneapolis police officers were not allowed to respond to rioting in the way they were trained to respond.  
  o Officers were told they were not allowed to use the tools at their disposal because it “looks bad.”
  o Politics, personal agendas, and personal feelings prevented police officers from protecting the citizens of Minneapolis and the destruction of property.
• Police with knowledge of the situation stated the Third Precinct could have been held if they were only allowed to use non-lethal methods, the same methods used throughout the week.
• Police officers believed they had the tools to control the chaos but were not authorized to do so and believe it was leadership that failed Minneapolis.
• Mayor Frey received differing advice from Minneapolis City Council members:
  o Jeremiah Ellison said to “sacrifice” the station, “You say, ‘Look, we’re not going to stand with our really scary-looking rifles and face masks and act like we’re in opposition to a group of people who, as of last night, were scared and righteously angry.’”
  o Andrew Johnson blamed the police for much of the destruction, “It looked like they were defending the Alamo and letting the community burn.”
  o Some council members understood the problems with abandoning a police precinct. Linea Palmisano stated, “You can’t let the 3rd Precinct go, that would just be the epitome of ultimate chaos in our city.”
  o A Minnesota Public Radio article that showed the above quotes later stated, “Those who advocated for sacrificing the precinct hoped that it would cool tensions. They were wrong.”
• Commander Gerlicher stated the city’s original strategy to protect the Third Precinct was to have fewer officers present as they feared having police officers around would just enrage the rioters.
  o According to an officer’s testimony, the psychology behind this thinking was that without officers visibly present, rioters would feel a symbolic victory of forcing the police into hiding and thus would be less likely to attack the building.
• Regarding the Minnesota National Guard assisting the City of Minneapolis, one staff person stated “I am not sure if that will make it better or it could make it worse depending on the response and the reaction to the response.”
Governor Walz’s Administration’s Philosophical Debate:

- Regarding State Capitol property, Governor Walz’s administration was afraid that if they mobilized in a certain way then it would prompt a larger group to come to the State Capitol building.\(^{212}\)

- The Department of Public Safety tribal liaison was sent out rather than a multitude of available Minnesota state troopers because they needed to address the “community and cultural concerns” of the rioters.\(^{213}\)
  - The Commissioner of Public Safety admitted that in retrospect he would have sent out more than one trooper to meet with rioters. Rather he would have sent out a team to provide an additional barrier between troopers and rioters.\(^{214}\)
  - The “complex environment we are living in today” was part of the reasoning behind the lack of the use of force to protect State Capitol property.\(^{215}\)
  - The Commissioner of Public Safety admitted if they could do it over again, they would make different tactical decisions but given the “climate they were under” they made the decisions they made.\(^{216}\)

- Below are the questions Governor Walz’s staff asked the Minnesota National Guard:\(^{217}\)
  - “Diversity and inclusion training?”
  - “Experience working with diverse communities?”
  - “What communities will they be coming from?”
  - “Will they have weapons?”
  - “What will they be doing?”
  - “What are the rules for use of force?”
  - “Do they have de-escalation training?”
  - “Be in regular uniform?”
  - “Wearing riot gear?”

- In notes Governor Walz’s staff created summarizing his press conference, a reporter asked, “Almost a complete lack of visibility of local police. How could there not have been a clear mission for the national guard when they were called in?”\(^{218}\)
  - The response as written was, “An armed presence on the ground where there was violence can be seen as a catalyst.”\(^{219}\)

- In response to a Minnesota state representative’s question regarding the curfew, Governor Walz’s office responded, “There is an important distinction between enforcement and protection.”\(^{220}\)
Key Findings:

- Our highly trained Minnesota National Guard and local police officers understood how to protect Minnesota from riots, but Governor Walz and Mayor Frey got in their way.
- While the riots were ongoing, Governor Walz had a philosophical debate privately and on live television. Governor Walz, Mayor Frey, the Minneapolis City Council, and the Commissioner of Public Safety all debated whether having more officers and Minnesota National Guard on the street would escalate violence.
- Governor Walz was quoted by both elected officials and government staff that he hesitated to use the Minnesota National Guard.
  - This hesitation cost Minnesotans their lives, communities, and livelihoods.
- Governor Walz and his administration were more concerned with the “current environment,” the “climate they were under,” “community and cultural concerns,” and “diversity and inclusion training” than they were about stopping the riots that were destroying Minnesota.
- A plan was in place to hold the Third Precinct without a loss of life using the same non-lethal methods used previously in the week.
  - Mayor Frey made the decision to abandon the Third Precinct based off politics rather than tactics.
  - It was unusual for politicians to make these types of decisions against the advice of their top law enforcement officers.
- Elected officials like Governor Walz, Mayor Frey, and the Minneapolis City Council believe that increasing the presence of law enforcement and Minnesota National Guard causes more rioting rather than ending it.
  - Protesting is a First Amendment right; rioting is a criminal act. The first is protected while the second needs to be stopped.
- It is the responsibility of Governor Walz and his administration to enforce the laws of the State of Minnesota, but instead they chose to select which laws were enforced. This type of enforcement does a disservice to Minnesotans by creating confusion on which laws will be enforced on any given day.
Governor Walz Ignored the Request for the Minnesota National Guard

The facts presented below outline and describe the City of Minneapolis’s request for Minnesota National Guard assistance and Governor Walz’s response.

Governor Walz Ignored Verbal and Written Requests for Minnesota National Guard Assistance:

- Governor Walz failed to mobilize or deploy the Minnesota National Guard and did not acknowledge the City of Minneapolis’s request for their assistance:
  - Mayor Frey called Governor Walz at 6:29 p.m. Wednesday, May 27 asking to send in the Minnesota National Guard.
  - The written request for troops was sent to Department of Public Safety at 9:11 p.m. Wednesday, May 27.
  - The Commissioner of Public Safety sent a text to General Jensen at 6:35 a.m. Thursday, May 28 stating additional Minnesota National Guard troops might be needed in the Twin Cities based not off the request from the City of Minneapolis but rather based off the night’s events.
    - That moment was a planning phase as Governor Walz still had not decided whether to accept or even acknowledge the city’s pleas for help.
    - To General Jensen’s knowledge, there was no request for assistance from the City of Minneapolis on the night of Wednesday, May 27. It was not until the morning of Thursday, May 28 that Governor Walz told the Minnesota National Guard the Executive Order (EO) was likely coming. Over nine hours after the city made a request for assistance, Governor Walz had yet to pass the plea on to the Minnesota National Guard.
  - It was not until late afternoon on Thursday, May 28 that Governor Walz signed the EO and allowed the Minnesota National Guard to officially assist cities.
  - The first written order the Minnesota National Guard received regarding the unrest was on Friday, May 29 at 2:00 p.m.
Governor Walz stated he preemptively told the Minnesota National Guard to get prepared on the morning of Thursday, May 28.233
  o Governor Walz stated he was to wait for cities to request troops before preparing the Minnesota National Guard.234
    ▪ There is no state statute or law requiring the governor to wait for cities to request troops before authorizing the use of the Minnesota National Guard.235
  o Governor Walz stated St. Paul gave the first request around 5:00 p.m. on Thursday, May 28.236
    ▪ Mayor Frey made a direct request to Governor Walz for Minnesota National Guard assistance at 6:29 p.m. Wednesday, May 27.237
    ▪ The City of Minneapolis sent a written request to Governor Walz’s office at 9:11 p.m. Wednesday, May 27 which was ignored.238
    ▪ At 2:00 p.m. Thursday, May 28, Governor Walz’s staff was on a conference call with the Minneapolis Police Department to discuss the need for Minnesota National Guard assistance.239

Over 18 hours after Minnesota National Guard assistance was initially requested and 15 hours after the written request for Minnesota National Guard assistance was given, Governor Walz had yet to decide if he was going to mobilize the Minnesota National Guard.240

City’s Pleas for Assistance went Unheeded by Governor Walz:
  • Early in the evening of Wednesday, May 27, the City of Minneapolis recognized the rioting was beyond their capabilities and they needed assistance.241
    o Commander Gerlicher stated, “The MPD was overwhelmed beyond our capabilities to effectively control the violence and looting taking place Wednesday, May 27th. This was made clear in our written request for the National Guard on the evening of Wednesday, May 27th. It was also very evident from the extensive local and national television coverage of the looting, violence, and fires throughout the city.”242
An initial request for the Minnesota National Guard includes basic information for the governor to make a decision. Once approved, more extensive and detailed information is sent while in close communication with the Department of Public Safety and Minnesota National Guard command staff.243
  o At 8:13 p.m. Wednesday, May 27, Commander Gerlicher sent the request to Chief Arradondo.244
  o At 9:11 p.m. Wednesday, May 27, Chief Arradondo forwarded the same request for assistance to the Commissioner of Public Safety.245
    ▪ The written request was detailed, specific, included a mission plan, command and control, and a specific number of requested National Guard soldiers, 600 at that time.246
    ▪ It also stated, “The MPD has expended all available resources within our Department as well as all available law enforcement assistance from our neighboring jurisdictions.”247
  o From then on Commander Gerlicher continued to forward more specific and detailed requests for assistance to the Commissioner of Public Safety.248
  o Commander Gerlicher believed the initial document “contained enough information for an initial decision to be made.”
    ▪ Governor Walz did not decide to mobilize the Minnesota National Guard until the afternoon of Thursday, May 28.249 In fact, the Minneapolis Police Department was never informed by anyone at the state that more information was needed nor did they hear anything back from the state that Wednesday night.250
  o The request was sent for at least 600 guardsmen at 9:11 p.m. Wednesday, May 27. Governor Walz eventually produced 100 guardsmen for the City of Minneapolis late in the evening on Thursday, May 28.251
  o After calls and written requests, Governor Walz’s office never stated it needed more information,252 but Governor Walz’s spokesman did tell the press that the governor was pushing the city for more details,253 even though at the same time their office was ignoring the Minneapolis Police Department and city completely.254
    o The Minneapolis Police Department made specific requests of the Minnesota National Guard on the night of Thursday, May 28 with the Commissioner of Public Safety stating the request was “exactly what they needed” and they were going to use it as a template for other agencies making requests.255
      ▪ The Commissioner of Public Safety and General Jensen acknowledged they received some specific requests from the Minneapolis Police Department on the night of Thursday, May 28.256
Written Order to Activate the Minnesota National Guard was Delayed by Governor Walz

Below is the initial detailed written request by the Minneapolis Police Department for Minnesota National Guard assistance, given to Commissioner of Public Safety at 9:11 p.m. on Wednesday, May 27. This came hours after a verbal request from Mayor Frey to Governor Walz. This detailed written request is described below:

**Initial request for National Guard:**
The Minneapolis Police Department requests assistance of the MN National Guard for immediate assistance with significant civil unrest occurring in the City of Minneapolis. The MPD has expended all available resources within our Department as well as all available law enforcement assistance from our neighboring jurisdictions.

**Mission Plan:** Area Security and Force Protection Operations Area Denial Operations Transportation assistance for law enforcement officers Logistical assistance for the overall security operation

**Command and Control:** The National Guard would fit into the MPD established incident command structure headed by the MPD. National Guard personnel would be supervised by on site MPD supervisors who would coordinate with National Guard command structure. The overall MPD commander for the detail to whom the National Guard would report to is MPD Deputy Chief Kathy Waite

**Number of Assets:** The MPD requests 600 National Guard Soldiers along with compliment of command and control. In addition, the MPD requests, vehicles to be used for transportation and support to all above listed missions
Key Findings:

- Governor Walz denied receiving initial requests for Minnesota National Guard assistance. After evidence was revealed that Mayor Frey called Governor Walz and a written request was sent to the governor’s office Wednesday night, Governor Walz started to say he received no detailed requests from the City of Minneapolis.
- Governor Walz and his administration did not inform the City of Minneapolis or the Minneapolis Police Department that requests for assistance were not sufficiently detailed.
  - In fact, Governor Walz and his administration ignored the City of Minneapolis’s pleas while the city burned Wednesday night.
- An initial request for the Minnesota National Guard included basic information for Governor Walz to make a decision. Once approved, there was more extensive and detailed information sent while in close communication with the Department of Public Safety and Minnesota National Guard command staff.
  - Commander Gerlicher believed the initial document “contained enough information for an initial decision to be made.” Thereafter, Commander Gerlicher sent more extensive and detailed requests.
- While Governor Walz stated publicly that no specific requests were made, at the same time his Commissioner of Public Safety informed the City of Minneapolis that the requests were “exactly what they needed” and were going to be used as a template for other agencies making requests.
- Over 18 hours after receiving the verbal request and over 15 hours after receiving the written request, Governor Walz still had not decided if he wanted to mobilize the Minnesota National Guard.
Governor Walz’s Mismanagement of the Minnesota National Guard

The facts presented below outline and describe Governor Walz’s management of the Minnesota National Guard throughout the 2020 Minnesota riots.

Authority to Call in the Minnesota National Guard and Options for How to Handle the Riots:

- The authority to mobilize the Minnesota National Guard resides solely with the governor. County sheriffs and mayors of cities of the first class can make official requests to the governor for assistance, but only the governor has the authority to mobilize the Minnesota National Guard. 260
- General Jensen stated the entire Minnesota National Guard could be mobilized but doing so included members who were almost done with deployment and members who were not fully trained. 261
- The United States Pentagon had several military units placed on higher alert as a planning measure. 262
- Over 91% of constituents who called Governor Walz’s office about the Minnesota National Guard understood the Minnesota National Guard needed to be deployed. 263
  - After four nights of riots, Governor Walz was finally motivated to mobilize the entire Minnesota National Guard due to the “threat of other cities having riots and the inability to control the situation in the Twin Cities with the resources on hand.” 264
  - The Minnesota National Guard was fully mobilized for the first time since World War II. 265

Governor Walz and Mayor Frey Blame Each Other:

- Fox 9 reporter Theo Keith stated, “The blame game has begun in earnest. Walz is clearly and forcefully pointing the finger at Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey and Saint Paul Mayor Jacob Frey [Melvin Carter]. He said the state had resources to respond, and the mayors failed to make specific requests.” 266
- Governor Walz’s talking points stated the reason the state was not assisting with the Third Precinct is because the City of Minneapolis never asked for help. 267
- When asked if the plan was to let rioters take over the Third Precinct, Governor Walz responded, “Ask Mayor Frey.” 268
- Governor Walz did not warn Mayor Frey about the public rebuke. Mayor Frey stated it “was a sharp departure from every conversation we had had at that point,” and it was “definitely a hit in the gut.” 269
- When discussing the breakdown between Governor Walz and Mayor Frey, Star Tribune reporter Patricia Lopez stated, “It seems that they need to be figuring that out together instead of playing what in retrospect, a game of hot potato.” 270
Governor Walz stated that if the cities handled the situation then the state would not have had to come in.\textsuperscript{271}
  - Governor Walz commented that state assets should have been sent in sooner. The reason he did not send them in was because he thought the cities, not the state, needed to keep the peace.\textsuperscript{272}

While Governor Walz placed blame on the mayors for the Tuesday through Thursday riots,\textsuperscript{273} Mayor Frey’s request for the Minnesota National Guard was ignored for over 18 hours.\textsuperscript{274}
  - Governor Walz said the state “took charge” of the situation at 12:05 a.m. on Thursday night/Friday morning. Two of the worst nights of rioting were Thursday and Friday.\textsuperscript{275}

Mayor Frey said, “Walz hesitated to send in the National Guard to quell the growing violence and [Frey] blames him [Walz] for allowing the city to burn.”\textsuperscript{276}

**Governor Walz Failed to Command the Minnesota National Guard:**

- Governor Walz stated the media and citizens of Minnesota expected him to be there to protect Minnesotans but that he was just “supposed to be there in a support role, as state law shows.”\textsuperscript{277}
  - There is no state law nor does the Minnesota Constitution require the governor to be relegated to a support role in such a situation.\textsuperscript{278}
- A reporter asked Governor Walz why he waited until 10:00 p.m. on Thursday, May 28 to make any decisions and come up with any solutions instead of doing something in the afternoon when the uncontrollable looting started?\textsuperscript{279}
  - Governor Walz’s response was it is the mayors and local police forces who were the leaders of the communities, not he.\textsuperscript{280}
- Governor Walz’s administration were the only ones who dealt with and talked directly to the Minnesota National Guard until Friday, May 29 at Noon.\textsuperscript{281}
  - City leaders communicated through Governor Walz’s administration to give the Minnesota National Guard orders.\textsuperscript{282}
- The responsibility of assigning tasks and duties to the Minnesota National Guard is that of the governor unless he decides to designate another.\textsuperscript{283}
  - When Governor Walz’s office asked the Minnesota National Guard “What will they [the Minnesota National Guard] be doing?” The Minnesota National Guard replied, “This is dependent on the tasking given by our civilian Chain of Command (The State, Governor, or his representative organization).”\textsuperscript{284}
- The Minnesota National Guard sat at Arden Hills “waiting for orders” while the Third Precinct fell.\textsuperscript{285} According to police, if the Minnesota National Guard was called in to assist, then the Third Precinct and many of the businesses on Lake Street could have been saved.\textsuperscript{286}
  - It was not until Friday, May 29 around 1:00 p.m. that the Minnesota National Guard finally received a list of missions.\textsuperscript{287}
While Governor Walz thinks the Minnesota National Guard are just “19-year-old cooks,” the Minnesota National Guard met or exceeded all timelines associated with the Minnesota Emergency Operation Plan.

- Governor Walz refused some of the General Jensen’s recommendations.
- Rather than allowing the Minnesota National Guard to independently share their experiences and stories with the public, Governor Walz’s office needed to review and approve the Minnesota National Guard’s statements before they were released.

Key Findings:

- Only Governor Walz had the legal authority to mobilize the Minnesota National Guard as he is the Commander-in-Chief of the Minnesota National Guard. Governor Walz chose not to fully mobilize the Minnesota National Guard while rioting overtook the state on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday.
- Governor Walz had the ability to call the Minnesota National Guard into the cities without the mayors’ requests, but he decided against it.
  - Governor Walz had the ability to talk with the mayors and suggest they request the Minnesota National Guard sooner, but he decided against it.
  - Governor Walz had the duty to send the Minnesota National Guard in to assist the cities after Mayor Frey requested the troops on Wednesday evening, but he decided against it.
  - The City of Minneapolis stated they were overwhelmed and needed the state’s help, but Governor Walz decided against it.
  - What Governor Walz chose to do was blame the mayors.
  - When Governor Walz did finally “take charge,” the chaos did not dissipate; it became worse.
- Minneapolis burned because Governor Walz hesitated to activate the Minnesota National Guard.
- When the Minnesota National Guard was allowed to use troops and tactics they recommended, they succeeded. It was Governor Walz who failed to lead and allow the Minnesota National Guard to complete their missions.
- Governor Walz believes it is not his job to protect citizens of Minnesota. He believes local leaders should protect Minnesotans.
  - Governor Walz believes it is local leaders who need to keep the public safe, not the governor or the governor’s Commissioner of Public Safety.
  - Governor Walz believes local leaders need to direct the Minnesota National Guard, not the Commander-in-Chief.
  - Governor Walz believes it is the locals who lead, not he.
  - Governor Walz did not lead, thereby failing the cities, the state, and citizens when they needed him most.
Consequences of the Governments’ Failed Response to the 2020 Riots

The facts presented below outline and describe the justice system and the effects of the 2020 Minnesota riots on morale and crime.

Failure of the Criminal Justice System to Arrest and Charge Criminals:

- Colonel Langer admitted there are deterrent effects towards a police presence, being arrested, and being held accountable through the court system for committing a crime.\(^{292}\)
- If they would have arrested the rioters on that first day, then they could have prevented most of the damage that occurred because the rioters would not have felt emboldened to cause destruction.\(^{293}\)
- Two of Governor Walz’s staff texted each other stating, “MPD has no plan...especially to arrest anyone.”\(^{294}\)
- Governor Walz’s administration does not usually arrest people who are illegally protesting on the freeway.\(^{295}\)
- The Commissioner of Public Safety stated the plan was to engage rioters trying to damage the State Capitol building with verbal de-escalation techniques as is consistent with community policing approach.\(^{296}\) The Commissioner of Public Safety continued, “The goal is to try and talk them out of doing the criminal activity as no one gets arrested or goes to jail.”\(^{297}\)
- Police officers stated it was the Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety who gave the orders to release rather than arrest rioters.\(^{298}\)
- Many rioters encountered no consequences:
  - Over 80% of those caught during the riots were released on the scene and not arrested. This does not include any rioters who were given “verbal warnings.”\(^{299}\)
    - Of the roughly 18% who were arrested, 88% of those cases were never processed by city or county attorneys.\(^{300}\)
  - This means that out of those rioters caught by police officers and those cited, only about 2% of them have cases pending. This does not mean that those 2% will go to jail. It means city and county attorneys will only prosecute 2% of those caught by law enforcement during the riots.
- The Commissioner of Public Safety expected charges of felony criminal damage to property at the State Capitol building.\textsuperscript{301}
  - The Commissioner of Public Safety stated this was a conspiracy case where multiple people were involved with both the mechanics and decisions to destroy property.\textsuperscript{302}
  - Colonel Langer’s expectation was “absolute accountability occurs” for property destruction.\textsuperscript{303}
  - Governor Walz promised consequences for property destruction at the State Capitol building.\textsuperscript{304}
  - Only one person was arrested, and the Ramsey County Attorney stated the criminal will be receiving “restorative justice” for causing over $150,000 in damage to the State Capitol grounds.\textsuperscript{305}
    - Restorative justice is defined as when “victims, offenders, and the community are brought together to restore the harmony between the parties. Restorative justice includes direct mediation and conflict resolution between the offender, the victims, their families, and the community. It holds the offender accountable to the other parties while also providing the offender with learning experiences that offer law-abiding lifestyles as realistic alternatives to criminality.”\textsuperscript{306}
- Chief Arradondo admitted to the Minneapolis City Council that lately criminals feel “emboldened.”\textsuperscript{307}

**Plummeting Police Morale:**
- Minneapolis’s police officers’ morale has never been lower, affecting the ability of Minneapolis to keep officers.\textsuperscript{308}
  - Minneapolis cops are afraid to respond to calls as they may become either the next incident or they may get killed in the line of duty.\textsuperscript{309}
  - Chief Arradondo stated 100 officers left his agency already with over 75 more estimated to leave. This would be more than 4.25 times as many officers leaving compared to a normal year.\textsuperscript{310}
- Some police officers stated they were never as broken as they were when “their leaders gave up on their home,” while others stated they are “publicly humiliated to serve on a department full of leaders who thought our building was nothing but bricks and mortar.”\textsuperscript{311}
- In June 2020, the Minneapolis City Council moved to “Defund Police, Establish a ‘Holistic’ Public Safety Force.” Under this plan, the city would “eliminate the existing police department.”\textsuperscript{312}
- Minneapolis officers “are demoralized and dejected.”\textsuperscript{313}
Reduced Community Morale:

- More police presence is needed to make businesses and individuals feel safe.\(^\text{314}\)
  - The community did not feel protected, instead citizens felt the city allowed the community to burn while “big empty stadiums” like Allianz Field were protected.\(^\text{315}\)
- A study showed that for those who work, reside, or visit downtown there was:\(^\text{316}\)
  - A 250% increase in people who placed their security as a top priority.
  - A 450% increase in people who felt unsafe downtown.
  - 78% who stated they felt unsafe at least once in the downtown area.
- After another shooting occurred in one resident’s neighborhood she stated, “I’m scared. I’m shaking. I don’t even like to step out right now. I don’t need to live in fear in my own home.”\(^\text{317}\)

Increased Violence:

- Between May 25 and July 15 there were almost 20 homicides and upwards of 140 people shot in Minneapolis.\(^\text{318}\)
  - As of September 1, there have been 56 murders in Minneapolis in 2020.\(^\text{319}\)
    - There are eight more homicides than in all of 2019 in Minneapolis.\(^\text{320}\)
  - As of September 15, 400 people have been shot in Minneapolis in 2020.\(^\text{321}\)
  - As of September 3, St. Paul had 23 homicides in 2020.\(^\text{322}\)
    - This is a 50% increase over 2019 murders during the same reporting period.\(^\text{323}\)
- According to police, crime has increased because criminals feel emboldened. There is open drug selling, gun violence, robbery, and assault.\(^\text{324}\)
  - Through early September, the number of car thefts and car-jackings has skyrocketed by 787 in the Twin Cities alone.\(^\text{325}\)
    - This is a 41% increase in Minneapolis.\(^\text{326}\)
  - Through early September, robberies are up 34% in Minneapolis.\(^\text{327}\)
  - As of September 12, Minneapolis experienced 3,674 violent crimes this year.\(^\text{328}\)
- Due to the increased violence, business owners do not feel safe and are now installing bullet proof windows in their buildings.\(^\text{329}\)
  - Minneapolis business owners are not allowed to protect their businesses with external security shutters due to a 2004 ordinance.\(^\text{330}\)
    - Minneapolis officials argued that external shutters create the impression that an area is “unsafe” and “troublesome.”\(^\text{331}\)
- The owner of a property the city was considering for temporarily housing the Third Precinct stopped negotiations after receiving threats to burn down the building, protests at the owner’s home, and threats towards “the literal deaths of individual police officers at the property.”\(^\text{332}\)
  - One of the rioters stated it was their ability to harass that stopped the negotiations: “Because all of y’all did calls – you harassed the mess out of our leaders, of the owner of this lot – we found out this morning that the property owner, Mr. Robert Lothenbach, decided to back out of his lease with the city.”\(^\text{333}\)
The Minneapolis City Council is frustrated at the spike in crime across the city as shootings reach a five-year high.\textsuperscript{334}

- Minneapolis City Council Vice President Andrea Jenk\textsuperscript{o}ins described lawlessness in the area around 38th and Chicago with some residents reporting having to pay extortion money to get out of their own alleys.\textsuperscript{335}

- In December 2019, Chief Arradondo requested funding for an additional 400 patrol officers by 2025.\textsuperscript{336} After viewing this request, the Minneapolis City Council decided to keep the police department’s force the same size.\textsuperscript{337}

- In June 2020, the Minneapolis City Council moved to “Defund Police, Establish a ‘Holistic’ Public Safety Force.” Under this plan, the city would “eliminate the existing police department.”\textsuperscript{338}

- In September 2020, Chief Arradondo stated “If we stayed status quo right now, we will end this year with numbers that are absolutely unconscionable.”\textsuperscript{339}

**Ongoing Riots:**

- **On Monday, August 24:**
  - Five people were arrested for destroying property while rioting.\textsuperscript{340}
  - Light rail lines could no longer serve the people of downtown Minneapolis due to demonstrations.\textsuperscript{341}
  - Rioters smashed through the windows of a jail in downtown Minneapolis and threatened to breach security. Hennepin County Sheriff Dave Hutchison described it as a “Demonstration turned destructive.”\textsuperscript{342}

- **On the night of Wednesday, August 26:**
  - Businesses were looted, burned, and destroyed as endless rioting continued.\textsuperscript{343}
  - At least 73 buildings were set on fire, looted, or damaged as listed here: \textsuperscript{Star Tribune Article Listing Damaged Buildings.}\textsuperscript{344}
  - The Minnesota National Guard was forced to be mobilized. Governor Walz stated the disorder had “nothing to do with asking for reforms, it has everything to do with unlawful behavior.”\textsuperscript{345}
  - Three liquor store employees were forced to lock themselves in a back-room beer cooler and were “terrified” as rioters and looters smashed their way into the store they worked at.\textsuperscript{346}

- **On Thursday, September 24:**
  - Governor Walz was forced to call out the Minnesota National Guard due to fear of rioting. Governor Walz cited protests in the Twin Cities the night of Wednesday, September 23, as a reason he called out the Minnesota National Guard.\textsuperscript{347}
  - Rioters set up a barricade to stop police.\textsuperscript{348}
  - The light rail tracks were blocked, and a fire was lit on the tracks.\textsuperscript{349}
  - Rioters chanted, “No justice, no peace, kill all the police” and “Die, Donald Trump.”\textsuperscript{350}
  - Rioters threatened reporters because they were taking pictures.\textsuperscript{351}
Key Findings:

- Police presence, arrests, and consequences through the criminal justice system deter crime.
- While stating arrests were an important part of controlling the riots, Governor Walz and his administration also chose to only arrest and prosecute 2% of those caught rioting.
  - Many other rioters were never caught due to the inadequate amount of law enforcement present throughout the destruction.
- Governor Walz, his administration, and county and city attorneys made the conscious decision not to give consequences to criminals engaged in the riots.
  - The message of “There are no consequences” has emboldened criminals.
  - Violent crime is increasing at a rapid rate throughout the Twin Cities while morale among officers and citizens plummets.
  - Rioting has been incessant and is likely to continue unless something is done.
- The increase in violent crime in the Twin Cities jeopardizes the entire state.
- The Minneapolis City Council’s choice to defund and eliminate the police department is reducing morale and increasing crime.
  - Elected officials, law enforcement, business leaders, and community leaders must start to recognize the dangers of not addressing criminal activity.
- State and local government, law enforcement, and the people who live and work in the areas where crime occurs need to collaborate and agree on a plan to restore law and order, protect the rights of freedom of speech, and protect the community.
- It is time for Governor Walz, his administration, the mayors, and city and county attorneys to listen to Chief Arradondo, Colonel Langer, and other law enforcement personnel. We need to stop emboldening criminals and take action to end the riot mentality.
  - The use of force by local law enforcement and the Minnesota National Guard is necessary to stop riots and violence.
Conclusion

As the country grappled with the social and economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, Minnesota suddenly found itself facing a second crisis on May 25 with the tragic death of George Floyd. Protests that were initially peaceful quickly exploded into the worst riots in state history, fed in part by long-simmering grievances that boiled over within communities of color, particularly over their views of the conduct of law enforcement, racism, and lagging diversity and inclusion efforts.

The riots precipitated the abandonment of a police precinct for the first time since 1863 and the full mobilization of the Minnesota National Guard for the first time since World War II. The State of Minnesota suffered extensively from protracted episodes of violence and destruction:

1. Significant riots occurred in Minnesota between May 26 and June 10, 2020. Since then, communities experienced additional rioting and lawlessness. These riots caused the deaths of at least three Minnesotans as well as injuries to both citizens and law enforcement. Looting, vandalism, loss of business, and the destruction of public and personal property totaling over 1,500 properties at a cost of over $500 million went unchecked for approximately five days.

2. It was primarily Minnesotans from the metropolitan area who were arrested for inciting the violence.

3. Governor Walz, his administration, and Mayor Frey failed to realize the seriousness of the riots and danger to Minnesotans if the rioters were not confronted and stopped.

4. Governor Walz failed to activate the Minnesota National Guard in a timely manner and instead tried to negotiate and appease the rioters.

5. Governor Walz and Mayor Frey failed to act in a timely manner to confront rioters with necessary force due to a philosophical belief that such an action would exacerbate the rioting.

6. If Mayor Frey had acted in a decisive manner and allowed law enforcement to use non-lethal force to stop the rioters, the destruction of the Third Precinct would not have occurred, and the rioting would not have escalated as quickly as it did.

7. If Governor Walz had acted in a decisive manner by activating the Minnesota National Guard when requested, the riots would have been brought under control much faster.
8. Morale within the law enforcement community, particularly in Minneapolis, has suffered greatly due to the actions and inaction of the Minneapolis City Council, Mayor Frey and Governor Walz.

9. Arrests of those responsible were not made in a timely or consistent manner. With the failure to prosecute and hold rioters accountable, criminal activity continues to increase over the five-year average.

10. The Minneapolis City Council’s history of inadequately funding their police department while also proposing to eliminate and/or defund them poses a danger to citizens throughout Minnesota.

11. With criminal activity increasing (particularly in Minneapolis), the safety of not only the residents of Minneapolis, but the entire State of Minnesota is jeopardized.

The primary responsibility of elected leaders is keeping the public safe. This duty transcends any policy goal. During the 2020 Minnesota riots, Governor Walz, Mayor Frey, and the Minneapolis City Council failed to protect Minnesotans in five key ways:

- First, they failed to recognize a situation that was rapidly spiraling out of control and misjudged the intentions of rioters, believing that those committing violence could be reasoned with.

- Second, these leaders were struck with indecision, fearing the use of law enforcement would escalate the situation.

- Third, Governor Walz and Mayor Frey failed to take steps necessary to stop the violence and prevent it from spreading further, even after they realized the situation was devolving.

- Fourth, Governor Walz and Mayor Frey both attempted to deflect blame at a time when Minnesotans were searching for leadership. In Governor Walz’s case, he made statements that were later directly contradicted by police officer testimony.

- Fifth, Governor Walz, Mayor Frey, and key city and state leaders failed to adequately communicate with the public during the height of the riots, leaving Minnesotans confused, angry, and frightened.
Governor Walz’s and Mayor Frey’s decision-making, combined with the Minneapolis City Council’s call to defund and dismantle the police, caused initially peaceful protests to explode into riots that swept across the United States. Citizens continue to experience higher levels of violence and crime in major cities like Minneapolis as well as ongoing lawlessness around the country.

This spread of violence, including the fall of the Third Precinct, could have been avoided or at least severely curtailed had Mayor Frey given local law enforcement the authority to use the numerous non-lethal tools and resources at their disposal, or had Governor Walz deployed the Minnesota National Guard earlier.
List of Recommendations

1. With public safety being a core function of government, law enforcement at all levels of government must be provided with the necessary equipment, personnel, and authority to confront and stop riots before they escalate.

2. Those who commit criminal acts under the guise of social protest must be arrested and prosecuted.

3. The Governor of Minnesota must recognize their affirmative duty to act as necessary to protect the public during riots and the danger of not addressing criminal activity.

4. The Minnesota Department of Public Safety should develop a comprehensive plan, in cooperation with cities, counties, and the Minnesota National Guard, to prevent and address rioting.

5. Governors must activate the Minnesota National Guard when necessary and without hesitation to assist law enforcement in controlling the rioting and protecting the public.

6. Elected leaders in both the executive and legislative branches must recognize that public safety is a critical necessity. Bipartisan support and cooperation to protect the safety and security of Minnesotans in the face of rioting is a duty that must be fulfilled.

7. To prevent riots before they ignite, the State of Minnesota and the entire country would benefit from a frank and open conversation about social injustice. Such a conversation is imperative to the process of rebuilding trust and will help determine how to reach a point where all communities regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, or cultural background can feel confident they are being treated fairly and equally by society.

It is unlikely that the 2020 Minnesota riots are the last episodes of lawlessness the state will experience. With the nation deeply divided by political, economic, and social tensions, even a small incident could spark a new wave of lawlessness. The time to begin preparing for “next time” is now.

These recommendations address the indecision, confusion, and leadership vacuum on display at the end of May and beginning of June. They are the result of hours of expert testimony about the fallout from the riots. Minnesota’s leaders should adopt these recommendations to better prepare for another outbreak of violence.
Governor Walz, local mayors, and city officials must immediately begin the process of implementing these recommendations. The Minnesota Senate stands ready to assist in that process.

The number one responsibility of elected leaders is to preserve public safety and order. Minnesota's elected officials must ensure our State will never again suffer the negative consequences or episodes of lawlessness that resulted from the 2020 riots.
Exhibits

Minneapolis Police Information:
- Cover letter from Chief Arradondo
- Written Testimony from Commander Gerlicher
- Additional Information from Commander Gerlicher

Senate Committee Information:
- Hearing 1:
  - Video from Hearing 1

- Hearing 2:
  - Hearing 2, Part 1
  - Hearing 2, Part 2
  - Video from Hearing 2
  - DPS Capitol Incident Timeline
  - DPS Capitol Incident After Action Report

- Hearing 3:
  - Hearing 3, Part 1
  - Hearing 3, Part 2
  - Video from Hearing 3
  - Written Testimony by General Jensen: Written Testimony from General Jensen

- Hearing 4

- Video on Increased Crime

- Additional Written Testimony Submitted to the Committee:
  - Kim Nguyen's Testimony
  - Jen Antila's Testimony
  - Hanna McNamee's Testimony
  - Jeff White's Testimony
  - Dayan Lopez-Martinez's Testimony
  - Ben Voas's Testimony
  - Anneliese Paulson's Testimony
  - Leah Nelson's Testimony

St. Paul Fire Department Data Practice Information
Governor’s Data Practice Information:
  • Governor’s Data Practice Information Part 1
  • Governor’s Data Practice Information Part 2

Minneapolis Data Practice Information
  • Minneapolis Data Practice Information Part 1
  • Minneapolis Data Practice Information Part 2
References

2. Commander Gerlicher’s Written Testimony
8. Hearing 1, 2:14:47-2:16:08
10. https://www.revisor.mn.gov/constitution/#article_1
17. Hearing 4, 1:37:30-1:37:51
18. https://jailroster.hennepin.us/JailRosterOnline/jail-roster
23. Commander Gerlicher’s Written Testimony
24. Commander Gerlicher’s Written Testimony
26. Commander Gerlicher’s Written Testimony
28. Commander Gerlicher’s Written Testimony
32. https://www.mprnews.org/story/2020/05/30/fires-continue-to-burn-as-more-national-guard-troops-are-called-to-minneapolis
In jail for riot, unlawful assembly, damage to property, curfew violation, emergency powers, penalty for not complying with police officer (Burglary arrests were excluded as it is unclear if those were directly related to rioting or not)

The Metro/Greater MN Split is based off MnDOT districts:

https://www.dot.state.mn.us/information/districts.html

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https://www.mprnews.org/story/2020/05/30/fires-continue-to-burn-as-more-national-guard-troops-are-called-to-minneapolis

https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/500268-st-paul-mayor-says-arrested-protesters-were-from-out-of-state

https://www.forbes.com/sites/sergeiklebnikov/2020/05/30/mayor-says-he-was-incorrect-in-saying-every-person-arrested-in-minneapolis-protests-was-from-out-of-state/?5c0cb777233c

https://www.mprnews.org/story/2020/05/30/fires-continue-to-burn-as-more-national-guard-troops-are-called-to-minneapolis


5/29/20, 11:06 PM, Lou Raguse Tweet

Hearing 1, 25-25:12

Hearing 3, 5:10-6:12

5/29/20, Tom Hauser Tweet

5/29/20 Tom Lunden Tweet

Governor’s Office Data Practice Information 1, pgs. 91-92

Governor’s Office Data Practice Information 1, pg. 97

Governor’s Office Data Practice Information 1, pg. 144

City of Minneapolis Data Practice Information 2, pg. 83

City of Minneapolis Data Practice Information 2, pgs. 119-120

Governor’s Office Data Practice Information 1, pg 64


Senate Council found no such law.

Governor's Office Data Practice Information 1, pg. 169
273 5/29/20, 11:29 AM, Theo Keith, Twitter
274 Governor’s Office Data Practice Information 1, pg. 150
275 Hearing 3, 9:47-10:22
277 Hearing 3, 9:47-10:00
278 Senate Council Found No Such Law, DPS Found No Such Law
279 Hearing 3, 12:21-12:40
280 Hearing 3, 12:21-12:40
281 Hearing 3, 35:22-35:55
282 Hearing 3, 35:22-35:55
283 https://www.revisor.mn.gov/constitution/#article_5
284 Governor’s Office Data Practice Information 1, pg. 76
285 Hearing 4, 2:02:16-2:02:31
286 Hearing 4, 2:02:16-2:02:31
287 Hearing 3, 37:32-38:10
289 General Jensen’s Written Testimony
290 Hearing 3, 58:14-58:24
291 Governor’s Office Data Practice Information 1, pg. 82
292 Hearing 2, 49:37-50:09
293 Hearing 4, 3:18:41-3:18:57
294 Governor’s Office Data Practice Information 1, pg. 67
295 Hearing 4, 15:58-16:43
296 Hearing 2, Part 2, 39:40-40:04
297 Hearing 2, Part 2, 39:40-40:04
298 Hearing 4, 1:36:54-1:37:25
299 Commander Gerlicher’s Additional Written Testimony
300 Hearing 2, Part 2, 25:39-26:09
301 Hearing 2, Part 2, 26:39-27:40
302 Hearing 2, 50:24-50:36
304 https://alphanews mn.com/county-attorney-restorative-process-columbus-statue/)
305 https://www.britannica.com/topic/restorative-justice
308 Hearing 4, 2:23:51-2:24:16
310 Hearing 4, 1:54:39-1:55:06
313 Hearing 1, 2:14:47-2:16:08
314 Hearing 1, 2:14:47-2:16:08
317 Hearing 4, 1:34:27-1:35:01

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